Writing History for Governement, Ernest May and 9/11

Ernest May, an eminent historian, provides a look behind the scenes at the writing of the 9/11 report. Worth reading for anyone interested in 9/11. But as a bureaucrat I was struck by this quote, following a description of how Richard Clarke's Delenda plan made no impact on the bigshots:

"... we learned that many documents in SOLIC files never reached--or at least made no impression on--secretaries or deputy secretaries or other assistant secretaries of defense or senior military officers. Pentagon witnesses reminded us that they had had a lot of other matters on their minds, including military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and the reshaping of forces to fit a post-Cold War world. "

Bureaucracies move paper. Unfortunately, you often need a bureaucracy to focus on an issue, but the paper storm rains on all alike. One of the first things a bureaucrat learns is to ignore paper generated outside her bureaucracy. Unless, of course, somehow it's going to be followed by a direction from on high to do something. That's one of the points of Jamie Gorelick's pressing the issue of the Y2K meetings that "shook the trees" (I think that's the term.) Such meetings can get people paying attention.

Another interesting bit was this:

"Writing the bulk of the report as straightforward narrative helped the commission achieve its surprising unanimity."

The narrative focused the commission on the facts and the chronology first. That's a lesson bloggers often ignore--you need to establish what the reality is before you go off.

Finally, the commission's work reaffirmed Richard Neustadt's observation about Presidential power. Clinton had little power over DOD, CIA, or FBI; they were all alienated. That's one reason to take many political scientists and economists with a large grain of salt when they write about bureaucracies. Personalities count a hell of a lot, especially at the margins, and 9/11 showed us the margins matter.