Iraq in Retrospective

 This is a comment I posted on Kevin Drum's post looking back at Iraq, which you should read:

"Wish I was blogging then so I'd have a good record of what I was thinking. As best I can remember I was dubious of Afghanistan, given the Soviets failure there, our failure in Vietnam, etc. But it went surprisingly well, and the aftermath seemed to be working well with Karzai getting support.

So with Iraq I was torn. The Post had a reporter who was filing good stories challenging the official line. I still had some skepticism about war. But on the other hand Bush did have Blair on board, and Blair seemed capable and had worked well with Clinton. So I think my attitude when the bombs began to fall was to the effect: I don't think I'd do this if I had the power, but I don't so I hope you're right and can do as well in Iraq as you seem to have done in Afghanistan.?

Fifth Act--Relying on Connections

I blogged earlier about  Eliot Ackerman's Fifth Act,  Thinking about it some more--one thing stands out is the reliance on personal connections. In the chaos of our exit from Afghanistan, personal connections were everywhere.  Initially it was the personal connection of American soldiers, diplomats, and contractors with those who had worked with them.  The Afghani asked their friends to help. As the days passed and the panic spread, Afghanis who had no such history contacted Afghanis who had the connection: a friend of a friend, a cousin, a neighbor.

Once contacted the Americans, like Ackerman, relied on their own connections. An ex-soldier contacted an old comrade still in Afghanistan.  As the days passed, the calls for help spread, asking any acquaintance who might have any pull over the Marines at the Kabul airport for help.  Sometimes the calls go to the chain of command but those at the gates have more power; the former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is eventually at the mercy of and relying upon the grunt, the lieutenant at the gate.

In the situation, the bureaucratic rules get bent and broken, which I imagine is common in extreme cases.

I also see the whole process is dependent on the internet--the appeals for help may be phoned, but the logistics needed to coordinate the arrival of a group at the appropriate airport gate at the time when the right American is there; they all rely on forms of internet communication: email, Twitter, Slack, 

I assume our exit from Saigon back in the day was somewhat similar, but without the internet the connections were much more limited.

Afghanistan and US

 Just finished Elliot Ackerman's "Act Five, America's End in Afghanistan". I liked it very much. While the title might imply it's all about the exit from Afghanistan, it's not, not entirely. The construction is different: the thread which drives the narrative is a series of attempts at coordinating through calls with friends and strangers the permissions and logistics of getting Afghans who worked for America and their families onto the planes after the fall of Kabul.  The desperation of the efforts contrasts with his description of the vacation trip with wife and children. 

Another thread is composed of episodes from his tours in Afghanistan (serving first as a Marine officer with the 1-8 (regiment), then as an officer working with paramilitaries (Afghan troop and US special forces), and finally as a CIA paralmilitary officer doing the same. A third thread covers episodes from his life outside of Afghanistan. These threads provide context for his calls.  He weaves his threads together into a nice tapestry, colored with thoughts on America's two wars (he served five tours in Iraq and Afghanistan).

He's critical of all the administrations--Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden for their decision, but most of all critical of Americans for the growing separation between society and the military, and the growing inolvement of the military in partisan politics.  It was published in this summer, when we still feared the outcome of the 2022 elections, which went better, more quietly, than we thought then.  

The Role of Intermediaries

 Started reading Sarah Chayes, "Thieves of State, Why Corruption Threatens Global Security". Early on she generalizes between Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban: naive Westerners come into the society, knowing and understanding little, find a "native" who's willing to explain and help and, often, are deluded by the intermediary.  That was her path. She entered Afghanistan in 2001.

Her description ties into an interest of mine I've had for a long time: the role of intermediaries/interpreters.  In American history we start with Squanto (as I first learned, though now scholars write "Tisquantum"). There's a long line of such liaisons, as time goes on often what used to be called "half-breeds", not sure what the correct term is now.  Even before Squanto there was "La Malinche", who was the interpreter, etc. for Cortes in his conquest of Mexico. Sacagawea was another interpreter.  

I suppose the media now serves in a similar role of interpreter/story teller and is similarly distrusted. 

But it's wrong to see it as wily natives scamming naive Americans; it's also the case that wily Americans scam the naive natives.  

Malkasian's Afghan War

 I commented earlier on Carter Malkasian's "The American War in Afghanistan". 

I've now finished the book and have some more comments:

• overall he judges our war to have been a failure.
• he notes that GWB had the most freedom to manage the war. Bush focused on Iraq and let Afghanistan slide, particularly on building up the armed forces. Rumsfeld is credited for being prescient as to the problems, but debited for resisting the mission.
• Obama felt he was rolled by the Pentagon at the beginning of his term. Malkasian agrees, suggesting with the benefit of hindsight he should have endorsed a change of goal and a smaller investment of forces. 
• Trump is credited for being able to say "enough".  He's dinged for "the Sword of Twitter (not Damocles)", being erratic in his decision making, and endorsing a one-sided peace agreement.

As for causes of our failure he touches on corruption and poor government, the existence of Pakistan as a safe haven and supporter of the Taliban, multiple missed decisions by all the presidents. etc.  His emphasis though is on the idea that the Taliban most closely represented the "real Afghanistan": Islam, and defiance of foreign influence, meaning that Taliban fighters were more inspired by jihad than the government fighters were by their paychecks.

It seems like a good analysis, though I also take from the book the idea that the government and society were never united, never resolving tribal rivalries, often with problems working with the US. Karzai was able to unite the factions early on, but he and the American forces gradually lost their unity.

I also note support for a pet idea of mine: the problems created by rotating troops and commanders through the country.  These problems diminished over time, as more troops and especially the special forces served multiple tours, and as commanders returned in higher positions.

[update--so far Malkasian's earlier book, "War Comes to Garmser", which is focused on the area in Helmand province where he worked for 2 years, seems better written.]

The Afghan Learning Curve

 Carter Malkasian's "The American War in Afghanistan" has gotten some good reviews and a lot of attention, since its publication coincides with the end of the war as far as the US is concerned.   

I'm most of the way through it. It's good, though it gets criticized on Amazon for the writing.  I'm not as critical as the reviewer--Malkasian likes simple subject-verb-object sentences which usually are clear and give at least the aura of objectivity. He overuses them. I'm more bothered by some of his tics: like using "assessed" as a synonym for "judged,..." and by converting nouns to verbs (which these days seems to be considered as good writing by some).

One thing which is striking about the content: the complexity of Afghan society, about which I may write more later.  When you imagine our military in 2002 trying to understand what they're dealing with, you get a sense of the difficulty of their job.

How Many Refugees Should We Take

 I would take all the refugees who pass basic security checks. It's not realistic to advocate for open borders; too large and rapid a flow of immigrants stresses the social fabric but the people who are now leaving Afghanistan are leaving because of our involvement there since 1979, regardless of whether they worked for us, with us, or simply within the environment we helped create. 

I felt the same way about Vietnamese refugees in the 1970's, and I think that's worked well for us

Carter Malkasian--The American War in Afghanistan-I

 The book is being widely quoted in the media as we grapple with the ending of 20 years of conflict. It's highly rated on Amazon, and no. 2 best seller on Afghanistan war. 

One tidbit--in the start of the war, from October 2001 to March 2002, we had 12 military killed.  In the last 10 days of the war we had 13. 

It's roughly 460 pages of text; I'm 100 pages in.  More comments as I progress.  

American Citizens Left Behind?

 Prediction:  One thing which will happen: regardless of the efficiency of the airlift from Kabul, there will be American citizens left behind, likely mostly they have dual citizenship. Some will remain by choice, some will be forbidden to leave because they are Afghans, in the eyes of the Taliban.

Second Thoughts

My opinion as expressed in my post on Afghanistan is different than Kevin Drum's as expressed here and here.  And perhaps deviates from Tom Friedman, who in the Times writes of the "morning after the morning after".

That's bothersome, as I respect Drum's opinions on almost everything.

So time for second thoughts:

• Trump's Doha deal with the Taliban promised we'd be out by May. Pence has criticized Biden for not respecting that.  I think Biden was right to take some time, 4 months as it turned out, to figure out whether he wanted to go with his gut or follow the recommendations of the military.  He would have been severely criticized if he pulled out in May.  It's debatable whether he could reasonably taken the whole summer to consider, so the departure would have happened after the end of the "fighting season".
• There's lots of finger pointing over the intelligence, did the CIA predict it or blow it?  We'll get lots ore on this.  My guess is the CIA was pessimistic, the military optimistic, but nobody saw the quick collapse (which seems to be Gen Milley's position).
• The planning and scheduling of the departure.  Military says they planned and did exercises.  I'll be watching to see if there was State/military planning, and joint exercises--such coordination has always been problematic, and in the absence of lots of high ranking Biden appointees and the transition coordination might well have been an early casualty.
• Based on how things have gone so far, it looks as if we would have done better by bringing the 6,000 troops much earlier--let them live in field for a couple months while the troops which have been serving there departed.  The new troops would be charged with maintaining order during the departure.
• A key element of the planning should have been developing a database of Americans who might need to depart, including both government employees and civilian contractors; a database of NATO personnel so we're clear whether we need to help other nations evacuate their nationals; and a database of Afghanis who have been on our payrolls in the last 20 years, plus their families.

One point the administration has made which I hadn't considered--early steps to evacuate were opposed by the Ghani administration and could/would be demoralizing to them.   I don't know how you handle that--if we're talking 20-100,000 people there's no way to keep arrangements secret. But that demoralization seems to be the main cause of the rapid collapse of Ghani government anyway.  

Maybe in an ideal world Biden and Blinken would have gone back to the Taliban and pitched a deal--a more planned departure. (Or departures, different arrangements depending on how events transpired.)  Problem is that Trump had bargained away US leverage, so anything we could have offered would have relied on Ghani's cooperation in facilitating a transfer of power.  

It's possible that Kevin is right--if things go relatively smoothly from here on out, what seemed to be disastrous two days ago will fade into the past.  I hope so.

Buck Stops With Biden

I remember Harry S, and his buck stops.  I think that is right.  I don't know that Biden did anything which led to today in Kabul, but it's his responsibility. Presidents can take credit for things which happen during their term, even though they didn't cause them; so too should we hold them responsible for the bad things which happen.  

In my mind this parallels Obama and the healthcare.gov problems.  In both cases the leader may have done all the usual "due diligence", but in both cases there was* no appreciation for Murphy's law, for the black swan event.  And in both cases the bad happened, and it was bad.   

In an ideal world the leader would do a stress test on his bureaucracy, worrying about contingency plans.  You recall Eisenhower had at least a contingency message prepared in case D-Day was a fiasco and the troops had to be evacuated.  

* I write this knowing there's been no real reporting on the decision process in either case, at least no tick-tock book which I've read.

I'd also note that Trump's agreement with the Taliban put Biden in a tough position. My knee-jerk reaction is that he perhaps should have kept the troops and support going until the last minute while paring down the civilian contingent and especially getting all the interpreters and otherwise vulnerable people on the way  out of the country. 

I Should Have Blogged Earlier

 Memory is fallible.  Blog posts are reliable, at least recording the moment.

IIRC when GWB sent our forces into Afghanistan I was dubious, remembering the British and the Soviet failures. Had I been blogging then I might have recorded that opinion, which I could now point proudly to as proof of my prescience.

Of course, had I been blogging a few months later I might have posted my opinion that our easy success in Afghanistan showed we might have learned our lessons from the past and our new technology with  precision bombs would enable us to oust Saddam.  I think that's my memory, though I also think I was still queasy about invading Iraq.  

We'll never know. 

9/11 20 Years On.

 Just finished "Without Precedent: the Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission" by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton.  Curiosity piqued by comparison with possible 1/6 commission and Ben Rhodes involvement.

It reads well as a straightforward narrative.  Some random thoughts:

• in 2004 we were still very worried about the threat of terrorism. Will historians conclude that we overreacted?  I think so--it was mostly a one-shot lucky blow.
• a couple times they note that in interviewing Afghanis the message was: "don't leave us again". In 2004 Afghanistan was looking okay, but it's rather sickening to read it now, when we're leaving in a hurry. A mistake on Biden's part, I think, though it could follow the course of Iraq--get in, get out, get asked back in.  
• on page 220 they observe that by 9/11 neither the NYC Fire Department nor the Police Department had demonstrated willingness to answer to an Incident Commander who was not a member of their own department.  I want to know if Bloomberg's reorganization of NYC government has fixed that problem.  I suspect not.
• on page 292 they decry the partisan atmosphere of DC then, the worse they'd seen in 30 years.  

I think they soft-pedal their failure to get Congress to reorganize their committee structure. 

Contrarian on Bounties

Big hullabaloo now about the possibility  that Russia has offered bounties to Al Qaeda [Taliban] to kill American soldiers/contractors.

While I bow to no one in my low opinion of the current president, I think remember from the book/movie "Charlie Wilson's War" the degree to which the US government encouraged and aided the Afghan resistance fighters to shoot down Russian helicopters. Distinctions can be made between that effort and the Russian actions as currently reported/suspected, but the similarity is uncomfortable.

A closer example from our history is the use of rewards for [scalps of Native Americans.

A Look Back at Afghanistan

IIRC, I was dubious of GWB's war in Afghanistan.  Memories of Vietnam and the "Man Who Would Be King", etc. were big in my mind. But the surge of feeling after 9/11, which I shared to some extent, meant it was easy to get caught up  in enthusiasm over the easy triumph over Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  That enthusiasm, plus the support of some writers whose names escape me now, led me to  very reluctant support of the Iraq.venture, though the skeptical articles in the Post also weighted heavily.  I regret I wasn't blogging then, so I'd have a written record against which to compare my memories.

Later my reservations on Afghanistan were raised by various books and articles, but there was never a clear decision point where politicians debated the issues.  And there was never a clear course, a way to reconcile my liberal desires for nation-building and women's rights and my doubts over the effectiveness of our strategies.

Now the Post is publishing the Afghanistan equivalent of the Pentagon Papers, documents from a "lessons learned" exercise by the special IG for the war.  

My bottom line, not having read the whole series yet, is this: most of the criticisms were valid, but it's one-sided, no answer to the question: "what was the alternative?"

I can only add this perspective: looking at Vietnam today and the status of US-Vietnam relations, the war didn't have lasting bad effects at the global level.  When you consider the deaths and injuries, particularly of Vietnamese, and destruction resulting from the 1945-75 conflict you have to deplore it.

Good News from Afghanistan

My title is four words, very surprising to find them in the same phrase.  Someone, I think Noah Smith, recently wrote there's an imbalance of news on Twitter; not enough attention is paid to good news.

The World Bank has a piece on how Afghanistan's healthcare system has improved over the past 15 years.  (Basically the government contracted with NGO's to handle care for specific regions, which has worked, and importantly Aghan professionals have been replacing the personnel who began with the NGO's.

Vietnam on TV and in Iraq and Afghanistan

Have now watched most of the Burns/Novick Vietnam series (missing the first one but I'd just completed the Lagevall book) and the last minutes of the longer episodes.  Had my memory refreshed but didn't learn a lot that was new, given that I'd lived through the period, following the media closely, and ended up in Vietnam for a shortened tour (11 months/11 days).  That's my general take, but I did learn more about the divisions in the North's leadership, i.e, the role of Le Duan.

While I found the range of individual stories and responses on the American and South Vietnamese side to be familiar, the stories from the other side were newer, particularly when critical.

Came close to tears twice, once when an American recounted his first glimpse of women in ao dais

which tracked my reactions when arriving in the early morning at Tan San Nhut airport, once in reaction to the piece on the Vietnam War Memorial. 

I'd say the series missed a couple areas which seem important to me, but which aren't the focus. 

One is the ways in which Vietnamese and American societies started to intermix and separate.  The usual way in which this gets covered is prostitution, with the real blend of the offspring of Americans and Vietnamese.  That got mentioned in the series.  But the blending, the intermixture was more than that.  As soon as Americans arrived, we started hiring help, slowly at first but then more and more.  For example by the time I left in May 67 we had barbers, laundry workers, hootch girls, generator helpers (don't know their exact title, but they helped with the generators), and others which time has erased.  Also mentioned briefly in the series was the black market.  I remember buying my jungle boots (with canvas uppers instead of leather as in the standard issue boots) through the black market--more comfortable than the regular boots but at that time restricted only to combat troops.  In both cases, as in our Afghanistan war, the influx of American money had a great impact on the Vietnamese economy and on the people--some good, some bad.  (Not a new phenomenon--recall the complaints of the Brits in WWII--Yanks were overpaid, over-sexed, and over here.)  

The blending, the intermixture, was accompanied by increasing separation.  When I arrived we were operating generators in compounds in Saigon.  I was then stationed at Long Binh, the main logistical base outside Saigon where we did our best to separate from Vietnamese society--we ended up with aluminum hootches on concrete pads, not the tents we started with.   Think of the "Green Zone"  

in Baghdad.  The logic is understandable: we don't want our soldiers killed so the best way to do that is to isolate them. 

The other point not covered was standard in accounts of the war: the fact that most troops were REMF's, as I was.  Lots to be said about that, but not today.