On Distribution LIsts

 Kevin Drum and many others don't understand how a National Guard member could have access to the sort of information which was leaked.

I think part of it is the pathology of distribution lists.  One of my early jobs in ASCS was reviewing and updating the distribution lists we maintained for various types of directives. These were paper or telegraph messages, but similar logic would apply in the world of data.

I think there's severa; aspects of what I'm calling pathology:

• no one pays any attention to distribution lists.  Once they're set up they can go on forever, automatically.
• distribution lists can be based on an office, a position, or an individual. If you specify x number of paper copies for an office, it's then up to the office manager to see they get distributed.  In today's world, the email/is sent to the office url. If it's a position, then whoever occupies the position or acts for the occupant would have access.  If it's an individual, then an individual address. Each of these are vulnerable.
• The vulnerability is in part the fact that things change, but as I said, the distribution list is automatic.  Bureaucracies may have procedures for "out-processing" people, but that's not a priority (I remember my outprocessing from Nam).
• The other vulnerability is the gap in comprehension between the originator of the classified info and the actual recipient in the bureaucracy. 

I'll be interested to see how close my guesses come to the reality in the current case.

The Hole In FSA Management?

 FSA has something called Box Onespan, which appears to be an on-line signature manager. I'm guessing from messages on the FSA Employee group on Facebook that FSA continues to have a hole in its management. 

What hole?  Someone who worries about the day-to-day operation of the county office; someone who is the authority on the common tools used in the office, who worries about training and answering questions.  Instead there's an ad hoc network of county personnel sharing information and tips.

The hole existed, I think, when I worked there and likely still exists. The problem is management in DC is specialized so no one has a unified picture of how things come together in the county office.  

IIRC there were occasional efforts in ASCS/FSA to come up with such a picture: training classes for counter clerks, manuals for district directors, and sometime the area/regional directors in DC would have a take. 

[Updated to eliminate double negative in title]