[I belatedly checked and saw I'd already posted on this book, so I'm changing the titles of the two posts so they make a series. ]Part of a planned series on Essence of Decision, a very interesting book using the Cuban missile crisis as the core example of three modes of analysis of how organzations work and act.
I'm struck by how much Kennedy got into the weeds during the crisis. Even so, as Allison/Zelikow describe, there were still disconnects where State, Air Force and Navy were doing their thing unaware of or misunderstanding his orders and desires.
Thinking about that presidency and the one completed on Jan 20, 2021, it's like night and day. Kennedy both by experience in the Navy and by inclination was hands-on; the former guy is hands-on only when it comes to furnishing his buildings or painting his airplane. LBJ, Nixon, and Carter would, I think, have been similarly involved, though with different perspectives, strengths, and weaknesses. Ford I don't know well enough, but I have my doubts. Reagan and GWBush no.
So America was lucky that the former guy never had a real crisis.
Another observation--the Soviet Union's communcation network between Moscow and Dobrynin in DC was marginally better than the 1941 network between Gen. Marshall and the Hawaii command (telegram delivered by Western Union).
And one more--Kennedy didn't have the option of a "surgical strike" on Cuba--dumb bombs on jet planes were too inaccurate.The authors say the decision to go with the blockade was due to that lack. Maybe with today's missiles he would have quickly gone to a strike. Then again, maybe Khrushchev wouldn't have decided to install his weaponry.
No comments:
Post a Comment