This paper investigates the institutional causes of China’s Great Famine. It presents two empirical findings: 1) in 1959, when the famine began, food production was almost three times more than population subsistence needs; and 2) regions with higher per capita food production that year suffered higher famine mortality rates, a surprising reversal of a typically negative correlation. A simple model based on historical institutional details shows that these patterns are consistent with the policy outcomes in a centrally planned economy in which the government is unable to easily collect and respond to new information in the presence of an aggregate shock to production.I can't believe the first sentence: a country of some 500-600 million people had food sufficient for 1.5 billion? No way, no how. [Update: according to Wikipedia, food production in 59-60 was 70 percent of pre-famine levels.]
Blogging on bureaucracy, organizations, USDA, agriculture programs, American history, the food movement, and other interests. Often contrarian, usually optimistic, sometimes didactic, occasionally funny, rarely wrong, always a nitpicker.
Thursday, September 23, 2010
This Must Be Wrong, Though Tyler Cowan Cites It
Marginal revolution refers to this paper (it's not free, so I'm not getting it):
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