Rebuilding Iraq

Dan Drezner blogs on the report of the inspector general for the Iraq Reconstruction effort here.

The report is here.

The lead to the report highlights the shortfall in the number of projects that are being done. Our great aspirations in summer 2003 are sadly trimmed in the gray October of 2005.

Dan cites the criticism of the planning for the effort. I'd like to focus on another area, one that liberals often ignore. It's true, as was cited in a Post article on Katrina reconstruction, that doing stuff for people is lots worse than having people do stuff for themselves. It's a lesson I've seen over and over, whether in the results of much foreign aid from the 1950's on or in a bureaucracy, whether building things or building software.

Why--take an example of rebuilding the Kabul/Kandahar highway in Afghanistan. Very worthwhile, successfully completed, not controversial. But. Highways require maintenance, maintenance requires money, money requires either continuing foreign aid or a functioning tax system. Maintenance also requires equipment and contractors. To the extent that the reconstruction meant developing a base of Afghani expertise and contractors, the highway can be maintained. But reports from Afghanistan don't show the development of an effective bureaucracy that can assess and collect taxes (not even a government that can do a tax law that is complied with).

Similar logic applies in Iraq, whether it's hospitals or schools. Unfortunately, maintenance is not a "sexy" subject. Politicians and political scientists put their time and thought into the policy decisions, but fail to recognize that for a long term achievement you need the supporting web of bureaucracy and resources. Even the inspector general is likely to be focussed on the building, not the maintenance.