If I remember the Woodward book on Iraq the decision to go to war evolved, it wasn't "decided" in the sense I'm familiar with. (As a bureaucrat you prepare a decision memo on an issue, giving options and pros and cons on each and the decider signs off, or holds a meeting to come up with an alternative. That's the way the Nixon White House worked, which may not be an endorsement.)
Then today I read in the Senate committee's report on Katrina this:
"In addition, the need to resolve command issues between National Guard and active duty forces – an issue taken up (but not resolved) in a face-to-face meeting between President Bush and the Governor on Air Force One on the Friday after landfall, may have played a role in the timing of active duty troop deployments."There can be problems when political leaders get together to resolve problems--they may not know what they're doing. But staff (read Andrew Card) need to follow up on missing decisions.
It's possible that Bush fakes being a "decider", relying on his staff to read his mind and fill the gaps. (That seems to me to have been part of Reagan's process, but Baker and Regan were more assertive aides than Card seems to have been.)