How Is CDC Like USDA/FSA?

 An article in the NY Times mag on CDC, critically assessing it and its role in the overall health care system.  One thing which stood out to me was this:

Around half of the agency’s domestic budget is funneled to the states, but only after passing through a bureaucratic thicket. There are nearly 200 separate line items in the C.D.C.’s budget. Neither the agency’s director nor any state official has the power to consolidate those line items or shift funds among them. “It ends up being extremely fragmented and beholden to different centers and advocacy groups,” says Tom Frieden, who led the C.D.C. during the Obama administration. That lack of flexibility makes it extremely difficult to adapt to the needs of individual states.

It reminds me of USDA/FSA.  Over the years the number of programs and crops covered has grown rapidly, The reason seems similar in both cases: there is a group/organization which feels strongly and has found a representative in Congress to push for coverage.  In the case of a disease/illness, it's patients and their families; in the case of agricultural products it's the growers. In both cases, they're tapping the federal treasury and have no countervailing opponents; it's not like the old days when big business was counterbalanced by big labor.

A Use of CRA

 Dems use the CRA on civil rights. Why use it on this, and not other regulations? The article explains why the EEOC is different.

Side Effects of the Filibuster Rule

 One phenomena of recent times is the giant legislative bill.  That's true of the reconciliation bill passed annually, but also of others.  

I think what's going on is the filibuster.  It raises the difficulty of passing laws, so the laws which can and must pass get stuffed with measures. As long as someone, Congressional or lobbyist, has the ear of a person who's involved in the writing of the bill, there's a good chance to get your issue addressed.  That cuts out the back and forth we might expect from committee hearings, which can expose difficulties and at least gives the agency which has to administer the bill some additional background and understanding of what's going on.

Here's a related tweet.

Thank You, Joe Manchin

As pointed out here, Joe Manchin won reelection in an incredibly adverse position and time. And his reelection is now key to Democrats winning control of the Senate.

Why Was I Wrong on Trump's Power Over Agencies?

After Trump had been elected president, I remember pontificating to a cousin and his family about the way the deep state would limit Trump's impact, except I was talking in terms of the "iron triangle".   That was conventional wisdom back in the 1960's--the idea being that a combination of the bureaucrats in an agency, the members of Congress on the committees overseeing the agency, and the interest groups lobbying the members and the agency formed a powerful "iron triangle".

With that understanding I've been surprised by the Trump administration's ability to overturn a lot of regulations in a number of different agencies.  So what happened?

A number of things have changed over the last 60 years:

• There's a lot more regulation and regulatory agencies, for one thing, and agencies which existed in the 1960's have been given more regulatory responsibilities.  EPA and OSHA are just two of the new agencies, and FSA/NRCS are an example of the added regulatory authority. I think there's a lot more generalized hostility to regulation now than there used to be, partly because of this expansion.  
• In the 1960's the discussion was more about the ICC or CAB, two agencies which were eliminated in the Carter/Reagan deregulation effort.  In those cases there had been "regulatory capture"; the agencies served the interests of the regulated, less the general public.
• In the 1960's there was a general faith in government, which carried over to endorse the validity of agency regulation. That was one aspect of LBJ's Great Society.  But while the faith was sufficient to create the agencies, it didn't result in forming interest groups which could effectively power the agencies as envisaged in the "iron triangle" theory.
• In the 1960's committee chairmen were powerful, Congressional leadership not so much.  That meant the chairmen could get their way reasonably often, despite the opposition of the President.  With the Gingrich revolution the chairs have diminished power.

The Problems With Executive Action

 Dylan Mathews has a post at Vox: "10 enormously consequential things Biden can do without the Senate".

He writes: "Pushing the limits of executive authority is sure to provoke legal challenges that the Biden administration could lose, especially with a 6-3 Republican Supreme Court. But even if only half of the options below are implemented and affirmed by the courts, the practical effects would still be hugely significant."

I guess my conservative side is showing.  I know the frustrations of facing a deadlocked Congress, a body which cannot decide what laws to pass. But there are problems in going down this road. 

• successful executive actions can be reversed when a new Republican president comes into office.  We can't assume that Democrats will always control the executive, or that the Republicans will come to accede to Dem actions.   Reversals can mean a frustrated and ineffective bureaucracy: one which will know their work is temporary and built on shifting sands.
• using the executive actions increases the power of SCOTUS, meaning it will become more political and fights over filling vacancies even more heated.

I prefer the longer range option of building support in the country which results in electing majorities in Congress which can pass permanent legislation.  That strategy is the one which Dems used for Obamacare.  In the end, it's better to piecemeal our way to permanent reforms than to become wedded to visions of perfect solutions for which the clock will strike midnight.

Fixing the Court

 A lot of discussion among Democrats over what to do about a Supreme Court with a 6-3 conservative majority.

I'd suggest one strategy not much discussed, which assumes Biden/Harris win and the Democrats gain a Senate majority:

• end the filibuster in the Senate (might be problematic, given their moderates who might be reluctant).
• spend time fixing the vulnerabilities in important legislation, like ACA and Clean Air, etc. 

My theory is this: over the last 4 years and more, conservatives have filed enough court cases and the Trump administration has changed enough administrative rules that good lawyers can identify the weak points.  Rather than rely on defending rules in the court, preempt the challenges by fixing them.  If the challenge is that the agency, EPA, etc., has exceeded its authority under the law, change the law to provide the authority.  If the challenge is that Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution, change the law to rest on a firmer basis.

What's iffy about this strategy is, of course: Roe v Wade. Although polls suggest a majority support its general outline, trying to legislate it would be like gun control.  The fierce minority would prevail over the majority.  I could suggest a compromise which appears reasonable to me, but it's a matter of principle for the opponents.  What would my hopeless compromise be?  Clinton used to say "legal, safe, and rare".  I'd think a compromise which added "early" to the formula should work, except it won't. If you had taxpayer funded abortions in the first trimester with over-the-counter of the "day-after" pill , then court-approved abortions for the next two with the basis being restricted (health and safety, rape, unusual circumstances), perhaps with a prescribed role for a voice for an advocate for the fetus, and taxpayer funding of pre-natal care for those who lose their case for abortion.

The details don't matter, because for people on both sides it's too basic an issue of rights to agree to a compromise.

Legislating Good Norms

Our current president has broken a lot of the norms and a few of the laws which existed before 2017.  One of the tasks of whoever succeeds him will be to figure out how to return to those norms.  One pathway is for Congress to pass and the president to sign laws which have that effect.  One such effort is already under way, as described in this post from FCW.  Rep. Porter is proposing to tighten the rules on "acting" officials.  President Trump has admitted he likes to have acting officials so he has more power: he can intimidate them more easily and fire them if they won't bend.  In normal times presidents and Congress acted reasonably quickly to fill most vacancies, although they were instances where a Senate would put a hold on a nominee in order to pressure the administration to take some particular action.

My opinion of Porter'sbill: we shouldn't have needed it but we do. The bureaucracy does not work well with "acting"officials at the top.

Iron Triangle: I Was Wrong

Soon after the 2016 election we had lunch with cousins we hadn't met before, and the future under our new president was a topic of conversation.  As a longtime Washington resident I offered my opinion, partly shaped by my experience and partly by my long-ago college education. My government courses had included the concept of the "iron triangle", a congruence of interests among government bureaucrats in an agency, members of Congress with a particular interest in the agency's operations, and lobbyists/NGO's. 

I argued that the iron triangle would limit the amount of change Trump could effect.

I was wrong.  And I think the iron triangle concept is limited.  The iron triangle works fine in situations where the NGO's, Congress and the agency can work together to advance their interests, taking positive action.  I think the concept was developed at a time where you could say the farm lobby, farm Congressmen, and USDA agencies could work together in what was called the "farm bloc".

I think the 3.25 years of the Trump administration have shown bigger change is possible:

• for many agencies there's deep disagreement among the relevant NGO's and Congressmen--the divide between the "ins" and the "outs" has gotten much bigger, so there's more energy to change direction in EPA, Interior, etc.
• Congress has given itself new tools, specifically the Congressional Review Act, to reverse agency actions, while SCOTUS seems more and more likely to limit agency discretion.
• personnel makes a difference.  In the old days, the "ins" and "outs" would alternate and with each having expertise and, to some extent, an indoctrination in agency culture. With the Trump administration there seems to be less of that, perhaps because people (as is the case with foreign policy) reluctant to serve under the President. 
• the president, through force of personality and unique traits, and lack of experience with governing is willing and able to break old norms.
• the base of support for the president packs a lot more anger and energy than a president's base usually has.: 

Slow Learners in Trump Administration

It seems as if it's the fourth or fifth time Rep. Katie Porter has questioned Trump administration officials with results that rate a tweet.

I did the math: a full battery of coronavirus testing costs at minimum $1,331.

I also did the legal research: the Administration has the authority to make testing free for every American TODAY.

I secured a commitment from a high-level Trump official that they’d actually do it. pic.twitter.com/RmolCtmNbG

— Rep. Katie Porter (@RepKatiePorter) March 12, 2020

If I were someone in the administration I'd use a sick leave day to avoid testifying.

Where's the House

MSNBC and others have a story that intelligence officials briefed senators on a Russian effort to blame the Ukraine for 2016 election meddling.

That's all very interesting, but what happened to the House.  I understand that protocol, and institutional rivalry, says what you tell the Senate you have to tell to the House.  Why wasn't that followed in this case?

Re-upping CCC Money for MFP

Today the Post reports that Representative Lowery is not planning to include replenishing CCC's borrowing authority in the stop-gap continuing resolution   Depending on the timing, that means CCC will run out of money before it completes the full $28 billion in MFP payments.  (It's hard to find the current CCC balance.  The USDA website doesn't show it; you have to dig through the Treasury accounts to get an idea of how much is available of the $30 billion it's authorized by statute. The last time I did that, maybe 6 weeks ago, there seemed to be around $15 billion left.)

This is a followup to the Post story of a couple days ago on the rather unprecedented use of CCC for the MFP.. Unprecedented at least in terms of the size of the payments and also, IMO, in the basis for the use.

E. J. Dionne Is Absolutely Right

He has an op-ed in today's Post on the importance for Democrats of winning control of the Senate.

Unfortunately that likely means defeating some Republicans I'd just as soon see stay, but given our growing partisan divisions that's the way it's going to be. 

Pork in DOD? Say It Ain't So

I think this story about how Congress highly regards certain construction projects in DOD bears out my warning to Trump back in February.

Advice to Trump: Don't Play Games With Congressional Appropriators

When I joined ASCS one of the things to learn was the relationship of ASCS and CCC.  Essentially the Commodity Credit Corporation was a way for USDA to put on another persona, a corporate one, allowing it to bypass the annual appropriations process.

It had the most impact for me when we were trying to impact new farm legislation and were on a very tight schedule.  Lew Calderone, the head of printing, would ask whether the program specialists could justify the rush job as fitting under the CCC's responsibilities.  When the answer was "yes", he could bypass requirements to go through the department and GPO and send the work to a printing contractor. (At least, that's the way I remember it.)

I was also aware that CCC and ASCS had separate inventories of personal property, depending on whether the item had been bought with appropriated funds (ASCS) or corporate funds (CCC).

The agency's ability to switch between ASCS and CCC personas was the envy  of other agencies,like SCS and FmHA.  

In the mid-80's through into the 90's ASCS and USDA began to use the CCC authority more widely, which is where the agency came to grief.  As I understand it, the procurement and automation people used CCC funds to buy a lot of computer gear.  What's worse, the computer projects didn't work out--success might have had a different result

Anyhow, the bottom line was the House Appropriations Committee put restrictions, tight restrictions, on ASCS and USDA on their spending, including spending of CCC money.  As far as I know those restrictions remain in the current law.

This leads to my advice to Trump: any effort to reprogram money to build your wall runs the risk of stepping on the toes of the appropriators.   If that happens, and I'm sure DOD will try to avoid touching anything in the districts of the members of House appropriations, the committee is perfectly capable of putting tight clamps in the appropriation act.  

Blast from the Past--Investigating President Carter

FiveThirtyEight has a piece on how presidents get investigated by Congress, including an interesting graph showing investigations of presidents from Nixon to Obama. 

Three points of particular interest:

• based only on eyeballing, ranking the presidents from least investigated to most (counting days of investigative hearings in the House) you get this list:
• GWBush
• Clinton!!
• Obama
• GHWBush
• then Carter, Nixon, and Reagan, much more investigated and hard to rank.
• the graph shows whether Congress was under the control of the president's party or not--which accounts for Bush's position, but what's most surprising to me is the high ranking of Carter.--if you discount Watergate, he likely was more investigated by his own party, than Nixon was by his opponents. 
• Reagan's high ranking is partly accounted for by Dem control of the House throughout his terms in office, but it's also a reminder of how rocky his administration was and the number of scandals.  

They All Look(ed) the Same

Saw a picture related to a review of a book on Calhoun, Webster, and Clay.  The picture is here.

I've long been aware of sameness in people.  Back in the day,all mainland Chinese wore Mao jackets, and there were no Yao Mings then.  Visiting ballet companies from the Soviet Union didn't present much diversity in size or complexion. Military parades showed soldiers almost uniform in height.  We still see some of this when viewing reports from North Korea, although my impression is that there's more diversity at least in dress there.

I've always related this uniformity to cows and hens--visitors to the farm could not see how we could recognize our cows by sight--to them all cows looked the same.  We of course knew different, but when it came to our hens they really did all look the same.  (Not really--when looking at group of hens I'd recognize differences while I was looking, but it wasn't possible for the differences to make enough of an impression for me to remember individual hens the next day.)

Anyhow, what's interesting to me in this picture is how similar all the Senators, and onlookers, look.  They're all dressed the same, and their faces look the same--typical WASP faces.  Compare the picture above with this showing the new House members:

Nieces and Nephews in Farming?

AEI notes the House Ag chair is pushing to allow nieces and nephews to be "persons' for payment limitation purposes:

"In the midst of this week’s negotiations over the farm bill, House Committee on Agriculture Chairman Mike Conaway (R-TX) is pushing to remove any limits on subsidy payments to farms through what has become known as his “nieces and nephews” provision. This provision would increase the number of people eligible to receive up to $125,000 in subsidy payments under one of two major income transfer programs, whether the people in question really participate in the farm business or not.* * *Currently, only two people per each farm business can be eligible for these programs — called Price Loss Coverage and Agricultural Risk Coverage — capping total payments to a farm business to $250,000. However, the “nephews and nieces” provision proposed by the current chair of the House Committee on Agriculture would substantially increase the number of people eligible for a payment. For example, an agribusiness owner with four “nieces and nephews” described as “actively engaged in farming,” because they participate in an annual earning’s conference call, would be allowed to classify those four people as “actively engaged” because of that call. The owners would then be able to increase the subsidy paid to the farm business up to a limit of $1.5 million a year.

Farm Production and Conservation (FPAC) Business Center

Hadn't seen this before this public notice of redelegations of authority by the secretary of USDA.  Turns out I'm way way late to the game.

This is what is included in the 2019FY budget for the center.

This is the explanation of the center:

"The Farm Production and Conservation (FPAC) Business Center is a centralized operations office within the FPAC mission area and headed by the Chief Operating Officer (COO), who is also the Executive Vice President of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The FPAC Business Center is responsible for financial management, budgeting, human resources, information technology, acquisitions/procurement, customer experience, internal controls, risk management, strategic and annual planning, and other similar activities for the FPAC mission area and its component agencies, including the Farm Service Agency (FSA), the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and the Risk Management Agency (RMA). The FPAC Business Center ensures that systems, policies, procedures, and practices are developed that provide a consistent enterprise-wide view to effectively and efficiently deliver programs to FPAC customers, including farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners."

It sounds very much like Sec. Glickman's proposal in the late 1990's, a proposal which was killed in Congress.

According to this article on the creation of FPAC from February Bob Stephenson is the head and the initiation of the center is Oct 1.

One of the complications in implementing this is the mixed legal status of NRCS--it's a federal agency working with the Soil and Water Conservations Districts which are established by state law and get funding from states and which have their own organization to lobby Congress.

Seeing Into the Future--Democratic House-Senate Split

Perry Bacon at Fivethirtyeight has a piece on the growth of the progressive wing of the House Democratic party.  While the Blue Dogs have revived a bit, the progressives were strengthened much more by the results of 2018.  This got me to thinking, always dangerous.

Pelosi will be the Speaker, and she'll have to work to keep her caucus united.  Meanwhile, over on the Senate side McConnell will lead a slightly stronger Republican party, which is also more conservative, losing Flake and what's his face from Nevada.  And Schumer's Democrats are facing a tough road in the 2020 elections.  He'll want to protect his incumbents and try to lay the groundwork to challenge the vulnerable Republicans in 2020.

All this reflects the increasing division of the country, as shown in our elections:  the red States went a little redder and the blue and purple areas went more blue, or in institutional terms, the Senate goes conservative and the House goes liberal.

So Pelosi, Schumer, and McConnell will be deeply challenged to get legislation passed, particularly the Dems.

55+ years ago a government professor of mine named Theodore J. Lowi theorized, perhaps not originally with him, that changes in parties didn't happen by the out-party changing their policies but by the in-party dividing and losing focus.  Not sure how that theory stands up to today's politics.

[updated to add second link]