FBI's Trilogy automation project has run into problems, with the Virtual Case File system being scrapped at a cost of $100+ million. FRom the SAIC statement:
"Probably the most damaging aspect of this development environment was the ever-shifting nature of the requirements. SAIC development teams would meet with the FBI agents assigned to the project to elicit system requirements, then SAIC would translate that into software designs. Often, however, the agents would look at the development product and reject it. They would then demand more changes to the design in a trial-and-error, "we-will-know-it-when-we-see-it" approach to development. The turbulence was not limited to the immediate changes demanded. They would ripple though the related parts of the software design. This cycle was repeated over and over again and prevented SAIC from defining system acceptance criteria and suitable test standards until requirements were finally agreed under VCF IOC this past summer. SAIC expressed concern over the affect of these changes on cost and schedule; however, we clearly failed to get the cumulative effect of these changes across to the FBI customer. We accept responsibility for this failure to elevate our concerns."This sounds very familiar, from my experience in USDA. I suspect SAIC was trying to get requirements from agents who weren't used to self-examination, or to automation projects, or both. It's also likely that the agents the FBI assigned to the project were not the stars; you wouldn't become a hero in the FBI by knowing software, you'd become a hero by getting Dillinger or a capo.
I'd also say this shows a set of problems in contracting out work, specifically illusions/delusions on both sides. The government believes they know what they want, and believes the contractor can read their mind and do anything. The contractor/bidder believes they understand the government and is willing for the money to promise to do anything. The incentives are to enter into the contract, hoping one can get by.
In this case it appears that "mission creep" is the villain--SAIC was on board before 9/11 when the concern was partially to protect against more Robert Hansens, and stayed on board after 9/11 when the concern was to share information across the agency. Sharing information is also not a virtue in the FBI history.
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