Blogging on bureaucracy, organizations, USDA, agriculture programs, American history, the food movement, and other interests. Often contrarian, usually optimistic, sometimes didactic, occasionally funny, rarely wrong, always a nitpicker.
Monday, November 28, 2005
Religion as Accident
Paul Bloom in the December Atlantic argues that the religious impulse results mostly accidentally from the way that human minds work. We have separate systems for understanding physical objects and social objects, with the one being subject to Newton's laws, the other subject to interpretation, purpose, intention. It's interesting, but I'm not convinced. I'd be more tempted to argue that people are naturally interested in good stories and that's what religion is--stories that make sense of the universe.
Sunday, November 27, 2005
Where Are the Secretaries/PA's?
The NYTimes has an interesting graphic on the subject: "Who Spoke to Woodward"? Don't know if the link will work without a subscription. While it's a good guessing game, it also shows the pervasive bias of DC, and perhaps the emotional reality of working in a bureaucracy.
Take a look at the graphic: it lists only "principals", no personal secretaries as they used to be called (remember Rose Mary Woods, Nixon's secretary?) or personal assistants/executive assistants as seems to be the modern nomenclature. I'd wager that the majority of these people have one or more people who knew about Ms Plame. But people never see these people when they discuss bureaucracy. I'd love to know if Woodward shares this vision problem. When he was hanging around the White House and ran into Mark Felt, was he really chatting up the secretary?
It's possible the answer is "no". The emotional reality seems to be that most PA's are so loyal to their boss (think Woods and Fawn Hall, Ollie North's secretary) that they're more discreet than their boss. (And sometimes more capable, though that's a topic for another day.)
Take a look at the graphic: it lists only "principals", no personal secretaries as they used to be called (remember Rose Mary Woods, Nixon's secretary?) or personal assistants/executive assistants as seems to be the modern nomenclature. I'd wager that the majority of these people have one or more people who knew about Ms Plame. But people never see these people when they discuss bureaucracy. I'd love to know if Woodward shares this vision problem. When he was hanging around the White House and ran into Mark Felt, was he really chatting up the secretary?
It's possible the answer is "no". The emotional reality seems to be that most PA's are so loyal to their boss (think Woods and Fawn Hall, Ollie North's secretary) that they're more discreet than their boss. (And sometimes more capable, though that's a topic for another day.)
Saturday, November 26, 2005
Gains from "Comforting the Enemy"?
Daniel Drezner posts an excerpt from an Economist article arguing that Al Qaeda/Zarqawi have antagonized the "Arab street" and draws attention to a comment:
The administration has consistently crticized the domestic opposition to the Iraq war effort because it ostensible undercuts troop morale. However, the suggestion that this same opposition helps to vitiate Arab claims of U.S. imperialism is an intriguing one."
This seems reasonable to me. After all, one of the premises of liberalism, I think voiced by J.S.Mill, is that open discussion is the corrective to dogmatism. I remember the 50's, when in the words of Whitaker Chambers--democracy/the West seemed to be the losing side. Communist totalitarian society seemed to have the advantage in allocating resources, as shown by big gains in GDP, culminating in Nikita's boast that they would "bury" us. (He claimed to have meant in economic terms.) Then, too, liberals had to trust to the idea that efficiency directed to a goal was not the end all and be all. While Cheney and his running dog Bush (while I'm stuck in the 50's I might as well revive some rhetoric from that era) believe that a single-minded, focused effort is needed to defeat terrorism, liberals must believe that the virtues of the society/culture will prevail, even when dissent undermines the morale of the Pentagon troopers.
[Economist]" Now, or so it seems, it is the cooling of the Palestinian intifada, a slight lowering of the volume of imagery featuring ugly Americans in Iraq, and a general weariness with jihadist hysteria that have allowed attention to refocus on the costs, rather than the hoped-for rewards, of “resistance”. At the same time, the rising tide of American domestic opposition to the war has begun to reassure deeply sceptical Arabs that the superpower may not, after all, be keen to linger on Arab soil for ever. (emphasis added)[Drezner]
The administration has consistently crticized the domestic opposition to the Iraq war effort because it ostensible undercuts troop morale. However, the suggestion that this same opposition helps to vitiate Arab claims of U.S. imperialism is an intriguing one."
This seems reasonable to me. After all, one of the premises of liberalism, I think voiced by J.S.Mill, is that open discussion is the corrective to dogmatism. I remember the 50's, when in the words of Whitaker Chambers--democracy/the West seemed to be the losing side. Communist totalitarian society seemed to have the advantage in allocating resources, as shown by big gains in GDP, culminating in Nikita's boast that they would "bury" us. (He claimed to have meant in economic terms.) Then, too, liberals had to trust to the idea that efficiency directed to a goal was not the end all and be all. While Cheney and his running dog Bush (while I'm stuck in the 50's I might as well revive some rhetoric from that era) believe that a single-minded, focused effort is needed to defeat terrorism, liberals must believe that the virtues of the society/culture will prevail, even when dissent undermines the morale of the Pentagon troopers.
Friday, November 25, 2005
Conservatives, Multiculturalism, and U.S. Reality
The conservatives at Power Line take out after multiculturalism today, citing a piece from Britain discussing supposed British policy:
When you think about the range of cultures within our borders, everything from California valley girls (am I showing my age) to the Amish, from the hasidic Jews to the Mormons, from the Lakota to the Appalachian country, from all the recent immigrants from around the world to the descendants of Virginia's First Families and the Winthrops and Kerrys from New England; we've a big spectrum. And mostly we accept all the cultures--we'll grant the right of the Amish to be Americans, even though their culture is very "un-American". Where conservatives (and others of us) object is when a group tends to deny the hegemony of the dominant culture. As long as a group goes quietly around their business, whatever their oddities, we can accept it as part of the American quilt. But when a group becomes vocal and insistent, then it becomes a threat.
Ironically, it's often when a group well into the process of melting that it becomes vocal. Witness the "black power" movement of the late 60's and early 70's; the emphasis on the great famine among Irish Americans; the Ku Klux Klan among white rednecks, and so forth. Conservatives should have more confidence in the power of the market system to bring cultures into at least loose coordination. You have only to look at the restaurants in the DC area (see Tyler Cowan's site) to see the power and attraction of multiculturalism.
Americans have often been suspicious of "multiculturalism" (which I define as the presence and recognition of different cultures on U.S. soil). After all, the land has seen a congeries of peoples presumably ever since the first immigrants crossed the Bering Sea. I'd like to think that conservatives have been especially suspicious, but it's true of liberals as well. The irony for conservatives is that they tend to be libertarians, wanting the maximum of autonomy for individuals. But when the individuals share a culture, it becomes a threat.
"As an ideology, multiculturlism [sic] is a corrupted form of Marxism in which race and nationality replace class. Like Marxism itself, it is an ideology that must be opposed if we are to preserve a country founded on the proposition that all men are created equal and endowed with certain unalienable rights.
I don't know enough to judge whether France is in better shape than Great Britain with respect to the corruptions of multiculturalism. Moreover, it seems to me that elites in the United States -- the 'leaders' whom John wrote about yesterday -- have similarly elevated multiculturalism into an operative principle, if not a principle of governance. We have our own multicultural problems with with which to contend. McKinstry's article outlines the looming perils that confront us as well as the Brits and the French."
When you think about the range of cultures within our borders, everything from California valley girls (am I showing my age) to the Amish, from the hasidic Jews to the Mormons, from the Lakota to the Appalachian country, from all the recent immigrants from around the world to the descendants of Virginia's First Families and the Winthrops and Kerrys from New England; we've a big spectrum. And mostly we accept all the cultures--we'll grant the right of the Amish to be Americans, even though their culture is very "un-American". Where conservatives (and others of us) object is when a group tends to deny the hegemony of the dominant culture. As long as a group goes quietly around their business, whatever their oddities, we can accept it as part of the American quilt. But when a group becomes vocal and insistent, then it becomes a threat.
Ironically, it's often when a group well into the process of melting that it becomes vocal. Witness the "black power" movement of the late 60's and early 70's; the emphasis on the great famine among Irish Americans; the Ku Klux Klan among white rednecks, and so forth. Conservatives should have more confidence in the power of the market system to bring cultures into at least loose coordination. You have only to look at the restaurants in the DC area (see Tyler Cowan's site) to see the power and attraction of multiculturalism.
Monday, November 21, 2005
The Road to Baghdad
Since Veteran's Day many have talked about the road to war. The President has attacked his critics for selective memory, forgetting that they supported the war resolution and thought Saddam had WMD. Milbanks and Pincus in the Post have quibbled with his statements, pointing out the administration had more complete information than Congress and noting there's been no investigation of how the intelligence was used.
I don't remember blogging very much on this issue. I'd classify myself with Bill Keller and Kenneth Pollack as a reluctant hawk. That is, doubting that Iraq had any connection with Al Qaeda, believing that Saddam was a bad man who ought to be removed, impressed by the quick collapse of the Taliban that maybe Rummy was on to something, etc. (I think the latter is a point often forgotten. The course of events in Afghanistan seemed to discredit many of those who feared a quagmire, who thought the US was following the USSR into an unholy mess. When the Taliban collapsed, it raised Rummy and GWB's creditability significantly. It lowered the effectiveness of the opposition to taking on Saddam, which seemed to rest on the quagmire argument. The only thing left was asking for international support, as in 1991.) I also remember the Clinton administration. At some point, Sec. Cohen went on TV with a bag of sugar as a prop in expounding the dangers of WMD. And Albright and Cohen went to a university as part of a campaign to act against Saddam and were rather ineffective in making it.
That being said, it seems obvious to me that the administration made up its mind to go after Saddam very early after 9/11, that they used everything they could and bypassed the bureaucracies to get some more to make their case, and had a closed mind. The latter is the sticking point: in September 2002 under pressure from Scowcroft, Lugar, Blair, et.al., the administration agreed to go through the UN and did its "war" resolution accordingly. The problem is that it was a forced change of course. Neither Bush nor Cheney had his heart in the course they were following. Of course, I suspect many Democrats thought it was the best deal they could get at the time: maybe going to the UN for international support would cause the administration to reconsider, if not, they'd done their best.
The implication of the current criticism is that an administration should have kept an open mind all the way up to the time the bombs fell. If the casus belli was solely WMD, that would be rational. You get the UN inspectors back into Iraq, they can't find anything even though they've got the best leads you can give them, you should go back to the drawing board and consider whether your intelligence assessments were really sound. But when you decided to take out Saddam on 9/12 and your problem was simply assembling the case and the public support, there's nothing to reconsider.
The decision to go to war is not a decision like choosing a college, though many on both sides talk as if it were.
I don't remember blogging very much on this issue. I'd classify myself with Bill Keller and Kenneth Pollack as a reluctant hawk. That is, doubting that Iraq had any connection with Al Qaeda, believing that Saddam was a bad man who ought to be removed, impressed by the quick collapse of the Taliban that maybe Rummy was on to something, etc. (I think the latter is a point often forgotten. The course of events in Afghanistan seemed to discredit many of those who feared a quagmire, who thought the US was following the USSR into an unholy mess. When the Taliban collapsed, it raised Rummy and GWB's creditability significantly. It lowered the effectiveness of the opposition to taking on Saddam, which seemed to rest on the quagmire argument. The only thing left was asking for international support, as in 1991.) I also remember the Clinton administration. At some point, Sec. Cohen went on TV with a bag of sugar as a prop in expounding the dangers of WMD. And Albright and Cohen went to a university as part of a campaign to act against Saddam and were rather ineffective in making it.
That being said, it seems obvious to me that the administration made up its mind to go after Saddam very early after 9/11, that they used everything they could and bypassed the bureaucracies to get some more to make their case, and had a closed mind. The latter is the sticking point: in September 2002 under pressure from Scowcroft, Lugar, Blair, et.al., the administration agreed to go through the UN and did its "war" resolution accordingly. The problem is that it was a forced change of course. Neither Bush nor Cheney had his heart in the course they were following. Of course, I suspect many Democrats thought it was the best deal they could get at the time: maybe going to the UN for international support would cause the administration to reconsider, if not, they'd done their best.
The implication of the current criticism is that an administration should have kept an open mind all the way up to the time the bombs fell. If the casus belli was solely WMD, that would be rational. You get the UN inspectors back into Iraq, they can't find anything even though they've got the best leads you can give them, you should go back to the drawing board and consider whether your intelligence assessments were really sound. But when you decided to take out Saddam on 9/12 and your problem was simply assembling the case and the public support, there's nothing to reconsider.
The decision to go to war is not a decision like choosing a college, though many on both sides talk as if it were.
Why Burn Cars Rather Than Loot Stores II
Earlier I wrote on this question. Since then, my reading seems to indicate that the French riots are in the suburbs. Speculating wildly, for some reason the French didn't see the decline of the "inner city" that we saw during the 1950'-80's (though many inner cities have rebounded since then, partially due to immigration, partially to yuppies, partially to economics) with the poor and minorities getting squeezed there. Perhaps the Muslims in France were housed in the equivalent of the US housing projects that were done to redevelop the slums. I don't remember a lot of rioting occurring in the US in those projects, but it makes sense that there'd be fewer stores and more cars located near such project.
Saturday, November 19, 2005
Undermining Troops?
A standard response to those who criticize the conduct of war and who call for something less than unconditional surrender is: "you're undermining our troops." We've heard it throughout American history. It carries a heavy charge, because it implies disloyalty to people who are fighting and dying. Is it fair?
IMHO it all depends on the definition of "troops" you're using. Usually it refers to the combat soldiers, the enlisted man and woman. In that sense I doubt the validity of the charge. The lower on the totem pole you go, the greater the concern with just getting through the next day and the lesser the concern with policy. (Reminds me of the signs on many bureaucrats' desks to the effect: "It's hard to remember you wanted to drain the swamp when you're up to your waist in alligators.") On the other hand, the further away from danger you get, the more the mind is free to focus on issues. (That's the definition of bureaucratic hierarchy--the bosses are supposed to worry about goals and objectives.)
Of course, the bosses like to wrap themselves in the aura of the front line troops, whether you're talking the Army, a corporation, or a civilian bureaucracy. It's the "we're all in this together" idea. I may be overly cynical, but mostly the idea is just wall decoration.
From MSNBC, on the House debate:
IMHO it all depends on the definition of "troops" you're using. Usually it refers to the combat soldiers, the enlisted man and woman. In that sense I doubt the validity of the charge. The lower on the totem pole you go, the greater the concern with just getting through the next day and the lesser the concern with policy. (Reminds me of the signs on many bureaucrats' desks to the effect: "It's hard to remember you wanted to drain the swamp when you're up to your waist in alligators.") On the other hand, the further away from danger you get, the more the mind is free to focus on issues. (That's the definition of bureaucratic hierarchy--the bosses are supposed to worry about goals and objectives.)
Of course, the bosses like to wrap themselves in the aura of the front line troops, whether you're talking the Army, a corporation, or a civilian bureaucracy. It's the "we're all in this together" idea. I may be overly cynical, but mostly the idea is just wall decoration.
From MSNBC, on the House debate:
"At one point in the emotional debate, Rep. Jean Schmidt, R-Ohio, told of a phone call she received from a Marine colonel.Note that the person sending the message was a colonel, not a lance corporal. So no, I doubt Rep. Murtha affected the morale of the troops, but he probably ruined Rummy's day.“He asked me to send Congress a message — stay the course. He also asked me to send Congressman Murtha a message — that cowards cut and run, Marines never do,” Schmidt said. Murtha is a 37-year Marine veteran and ranking Democrat on the defense appropriations subcommittee."
Friday, November 18, 2005
Why Burn Cars Rather Than Loot Stores?
The recent spate of unrest in France has triggered some sociological speculation. Supposedly France is a nation so committed to equality under the law that it refuses to recognize religious/ethnic groupings that aren't doing well. There's also been some speculation that the unrest is mostly unique to France, with the implication that the U.S. wouldn't see such an epidemic of car burnings, etc.
But I've another question: why do the French burn cars? Remembering the MLK riots, there was a lot of looting and burning of stores. I think that the LA riots after the Rodney King arrest had the same pattern. But I don't remember a lot of cars being burned. What's the difference?
First, it might be distortions of reporting and my memory. But as I could write that sentence almost every time I blog, we won't worry about approaching senility and will instead assume that there's a real difference in riot patterns.
It could be that cars have different symbolic value in different societies. Or that the ownership patterns are different--in the U.S. some poor people own cars, in France, few of the angry (don't know the best term to use for second generation young Moslem men of North African extraction) do.
It could be that in U.S. slums, the cars parked on the streets belong to the residents, whereas in France the cars belong to outsiders. But that assumes that the riots are happening where people live, as opposed to the rioters gathering on the borderlines of the ghetto.
It could be that in LA and DC, the riots had some underlying economic tensions--blacks angry at Jewish/Korean/whatever storeowners. Maybe in France the angry are housed in big developments. Maybe in France the angry are in the suburbs with nearby cars while in the US the angry were mostly in the inner city with stores but no cars.
Or maybe it's just a case of "monkey see, monkey do"? (New question--since that's an old phrase, why is it a surprise to primatologists that primates have culture?)
But I've another question: why do the French burn cars? Remembering the MLK riots, there was a lot of looting and burning of stores. I think that the LA riots after the Rodney King arrest had the same pattern. But I don't remember a lot of cars being burned. What's the difference?
First, it might be distortions of reporting and my memory. But as I could write that sentence almost every time I blog, we won't worry about approaching senility and will instead assume that there's a real difference in riot patterns.
It could be that cars have different symbolic value in different societies. Or that the ownership patterns are different--in the U.S. some poor people own cars, in France, few of the angry (don't know the best term to use for second generation young Moslem men of North African extraction) do.
It could be that in U.S. slums, the cars parked on the streets belong to the residents, whereas in France the cars belong to outsiders. But that assumes that the riots are happening where people live, as opposed to the rioters gathering on the borderlines of the ghetto.
It could be that in LA and DC, the riots had some underlying economic tensions--blacks angry at Jewish/Korean/whatever storeowners. Maybe in France the angry are housed in big developments. Maybe in France the angry are in the suburbs with nearby cars while in the US the angry were mostly in the inner city with stores but no cars.
Or maybe it's just a case of "monkey see, monkey do"? (New question--since that's an old phrase, why is it a surprise to primatologists that primates have culture?)
Thursday, November 17, 2005
Bridges to Nowhere, RIP? Or a Redefinition of "Saving"
Seems the Republicans have decided to remove the earmark for the "bridges to nowhere" in Alaska. Instead they're giving the money to Alaska to do with what they will. This they will call "cutting government waste and fat", "saving the taxpayers money", and "being responsible".
No wonder our education system is doing poorly. How can you expect eighth graders to keep up with all these changes in the language?
No wonder our education system is doing poorly. How can you expect eighth graders to keep up with all these changes in the language?
Most People..and Children Above Average
A phrase I picked up a few days ago, I think from a discussion of a study of how people assessed other people in their decision-making is:
"By definition, most people are in the majority." It blew my mind, because it sounds like Garrison Keillor's Lake Woebegon, where all children are above average. But it's really the same logic, reversed. Using a mathematical truth, it states a conclusion that's not obvious.
The discussion (perhaps in the Sunday Post Outlook) was on research into people's behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma situations (where it's to your self-interest to rat on the other guy, but the best course of action for both is to zip lips). Apparently people are surprisingly apt to adopt the best course, surprisingly at least to economists who have no imagination. An evolutionist would say that, if it's the best course, people would have evolved to figure it out.
The logic of the argument is that people make a decision by looking at themselves, then figuring that other players in the game will be and act like themselves. The scientist said this was rational, because most people will be in the majority most of the time.
Still blows my mind.
"By definition, most people are in the majority." It blew my mind, because it sounds like Garrison Keillor's Lake Woebegon, where all children are above average. But it's really the same logic, reversed. Using a mathematical truth, it states a conclusion that's not obvious.
The discussion (perhaps in the Sunday Post Outlook) was on research into people's behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma situations (where it's to your self-interest to rat on the other guy, but the best course of action for both is to zip lips). Apparently people are surprisingly apt to adopt the best course, surprisingly at least to economists who have no imagination. An evolutionist would say that, if it's the best course, people would have evolved to figure it out.
The logic of the argument is that people make a decision by looking at themselves, then figuring that other players in the game will be and act like themselves. The scientist said this was rational, because most people will be in the majority most of the time.
Still blows my mind.
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